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Dicta Observes + + +
STULTIFIED JUSTICE

In this issue will be found an article entitled "The Law's
Delay", by Bentley McMullin of the Denver Bar. The facts
presented need no further comment. None will dispute the
evil of delayed trial of cases. Economy and the elimination
of waste has been the outstanding achievement in American
business. The progress in law and the trial of cases have not
kept pace with strides in business.
NEED FOR SPEEDIER TRIALS RECOGNIZED

After about two years of careful research in the administration of justice in New York, the Institute of Law of Johns
Hopkins University recently published a pamphlet entitled
"Study of Civil Justice in New York". The data analyzed
disclosed that more than one-half of the litigation may be
classified as collection litigation. One-third of the cases filed
involve accident litigation. Thus five-sixths of the cases filed
are accounted for. The problem then lies in the prompt disposal of these cases so as to relieve the congestion in the Courts.
SUGGESTED REMEDIES

Data furnished through the courtesy of the Clerk's office
of the Denver District Court show that in 1930, 17 2/3% of
the cases filed involved less than $500; 8 1/5% of the cases
filed were between $500 to $1000; of 195 cases taken at randow 95 were less than $1000. As shown by these figures
25 3/4% of the cases filed involve less than $1000. This figure could be considerably increased since many accident cases
are filed in which the sum prayed for as damages is large but
the actual sum justly due is smaller.
The method of procedure in our Justice Courts has
demonstrated an expeditious manner of disposal of cases. As
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is familiar to all, no pleadings are required in the ordinary
case. The defendant is brought before the Court by the
summons being served by the constable of the Court returnable at a maximum of 15 days for an individual defendant
and 30 days for a corporation defendant. The parties appear
and the case is ready for trial. In this manner the two Justices of the Peace in Denver have filed in their Courts an
aggregate of almost one thousand cases per month. The creation of a Court to function in the manner of the present Justice
Courts and having jurisdiction up to $1000 would lighten the
burden of the present Courts of Record in Denver of approximately 35% of its cases and permit speedy trial of cases.
OTHER REMEDIES

In the local courts the filing of dilatory motions without
merit has become a part of the regular procedure of the lawyers. It is the exceptional case in which an answer is promptly filed and the trial of the case proceeded with. The Judges
of the Courts are powerless to facilitate the trial of cases in
the face of the lawyer who files every type of pleading to
delay and harass the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action.
CASE ASSIGNING

Dicta congratulates the Judges of the Denver District
Court upon their resolution to continue the numbering and
assigning of cases to their respective divisions in open court,
instituted under the regime of Judge E. V. Holland, as presiding judge of the bench. It is a gesture to the litigant that
he may secure his day in court, before ,an impartial judgeone to whom justice is tantamount and dispensed equally to
all who come before the Court.
JAFFA MEMORIAL

A plaque as a memorial to the late Joseph S. Jaffa was
presented to Denver University Law School on November 12,
1931, by the legal fraternity of Tau Epsilon Rho of which he
was an honorary member. George C. Manly, Dean Emeritus
of the Denver Law School, eulogized his memory in the words
"he well realized the duty of the bar for public service". It
was a fitting tribute to the memory of the deceased.

A COMPLEX LAW SUIT

A

By Samuel M. Goldberg of the Denver Bar

CASE recently pending in the District Court developed many complications and presented an extraordinary situation in addition to various legal problems.
We are all more or less familiar with the facts in the
recent attempt by some alleged St. Louis bandits to rob The
Golden Eagle Dry Goods Company. However, to present
the several problems and entanglements which arose in this
case, it is necessary to repeat some of the facts.
On Sunday, May 10, 1931, the three bandits forced their
way into department store and thereafter attempted to "blow"
the safes, which contained large sums of money. While they
were so engaged, the watchman pulled the alarm box, which
notified the police. When the police arrived, a gun battle
ensued and one of the department managers was seriously
wounded.
At the time the bandits were arrested, the police impounded a Cadillac Sedan, approximately $5000.00 in cash,
jewelry and personal belongings. This property created the
incentive for the subsequent law suits.
On May 12, the injured employe brought suit in tort
against the three bandits for injuries sustained, and on the
same day, the summons and complaint were served on each
of the defendants.
On May 13, the three bandits executed a confession of
judgment note in the sum of $7500.00 payable to a St. Louis
attorney who had-in the meantime arrived to act as counsel for
them. On May 15, the case was docketed and judgment on
the note was rendered by confession in the sum of $7500.00
plus approximately $1100.00 attorney's fees for services in
suing on the note, although the attorney appeared pro se, and
no statement had been made in the pleading or otherwise that
any such fees had been incurred. Execution on the judgment
was immediately issued and a levy was made on the same day
attaching all of the property belonging to the said bandits.
On May 16, the same property was attached by an Omaha concern claiming that some of the money in possession of the
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bandits was stolen. They sued in assumpsit for money had
and received, since in order to attach, it was necessary at that
time that the claim be founded upon a contract. On May 18,
the Legislature passed an act permitting residents to attach on
tort in case of nonresident defendants. By virtue of this Legislative act, the injured employe intervened in the attachment
suit which was started by the Omaha concern, and both the
injured employe and the Omaha concern filed motions for
leave to intervene in the case wherein the confession of judgment was obtained, to be made parties defendant for purpose
of vacating judgment and recalling the execution.
The opposing counsel contended that the intervenors were
strangers to the judgment and as such could not file petitions
of intervention in the original proceedings, that the proper
method was by separate suit in equity to set aside the judgment, and that such action could only be maintained by a
judgment creditor. The intervenors contended, in view of the
unusual circumstances of the case, that they had the right to
move to vacate the judgment and be made parties defendant;
that the execution was issued prematurely since the five day
stay had not elapsed; and that the Court on its own motion
could in such circumstances vacate the judgment and recall
the execution.
It was obvious that, if the judgment and execution were
sustained, the judgment creditor would then have a preferred
lien upon all the funds and property to satisfy his judgment
to the exclusion of the other claimants. If however the execution were recalled, then it would be necessary for the judgment creditor to share pro rata in the attachment suit which
was started on May 16 by the Omaha concern.
The authorities and argument presented in this article are
merely the contentions of the intervenors and contain but a
short brief on the various propositions submitted.
There is direct authority in the case of Gibson v. Ferrell,
77 Kan. 454, 94 P. 783, which holds that the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure for intervention are not exclusive,
but the Court may, in furtherance of justice, and upon broad
principles of manifest justice, permit such intervention.
"The application to intervene falls within no provision of the Code of

Civil Procedure, but, notwithstanding this fact, a district court action upon
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principles of manifest justice may, in cases not covered by the Code, permit
one not a party to the suit to intervene either before or after judgment for the
protection or advancement of some right with reference to the subject-matter
of the litigation which he holds. * * *,,

The Kansas case is approved in Sizemore v. Dill, (Okla.)
220 P. 352.
In the case of Richfield Oil Company v. Western
Machinery Company, 279 Fed. 852, 855, the Court states:
"Of course the general rule is that an application to intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. But if one presents a situation
where he will lose a meritorious claim unless he can obtain relief by coming
into the main suit, to say that he may not intervene is to deprive him of the
only way by which he can have an opportunity to be heard."

Our Supreme Court has adopted the rule that strangers
to a judgment by confession are not concluded by its date or
by its recitals; they are at liberty to impeach it for fraud by
an original action, and if successful, to restrain the enforcement thereof to the prejudice of their rights.
Schuster vs. Rader 13 Colo. 329, 335, 336.
The serious question which arose in this matter is whether
the intervenor must seek his relief thru equity by a separate
action, or could the same object be accomplished by motion
in the main case. An elaborate discussion on this proposition
is contained in Debois vs. Clark, 12 Colo. App. 220, 228. In
this case, a judgment was taken against the defendant who
claimed that no service was made upon him. The defendant
filed a motion to vacate and be relieved from the judgment.
The plaintiff contended that defendant was a party to the suit
and should have moved to vacate the judgment within the time
prescribed by the Code. The Court states:
"The privilege is granted to parties, but a person who was never served
with process and who never appeared IS NOT A PARTY within the meaning of that provision."

Thus we have the same situation that a person not a party filed
a motion to vacate. The Court says on pages 228 and 229:
"The next question is whether relief can be obtained by a motion, entitled in the cause, and addressed to the court which rendered the judgment
of whether the party complaining must resort to bill in equity to set aside the
judgment. In several of the cases which we have cited, it is held that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction of the person may be impeached in equity,
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especially where a showing is made that injustice would result from the enforcement of the judgment; and it has been decided by our supreme court in
Wilson v. Hawthorne, 14 Colo. 530, that a court of equity will entertain
jurisdiction, in a proper case, to set aside a judgment so obtained. But, because equity will not decline jurisdiction, it does not follow that the same
purpose may not be accomplished by motion. * * * And 'there is no reason in
sight why the questions of fact involved in a proceeding to set aside a judgment, may not be tried and determined as well and as satisfactorily upon
motion as upon bill. * * *"

And at page 230, the Court further states:
"There are other decisions to the same purport, but those which we have
noticed are enough for present purposes. In view of the consideration that a
complete investigation can be had on motion, there is no valid reason why the
complaining party, who has commenced by motion, should be driven to a
proceeding in equity. THE REMEDIES ARE CONCURRENT, AND
EITHER MAY BE SELECTED.

Likewise in the case of Jotter v. Marvin, 165 P. (Colo.) 269,
the Court states on page 270:
"To all intents and purposes this constituted a direct attack upon it,
which takes the place of a suit in equity and stands exactly on the same plane.
By thus doing he gave jurisdiction to that court of his person, and when his
motion was denied, it has precisely the same force and effect as if he had
brought an independent suit in equity for that purpose."

From the cases quoted in both of these decisions, the
Court recognizes that there are four methods by which a judgment may be attacked:
1. By motion, or
2. By answer or cross complaint, or
3. By equitable action to cancel or enjoin its enforcement, or
4. By Writ of Error or possibly Bill of Review.

(Quoting from Kavanaugh vs. Hamilton, 53 Colo.
157, 163.)
The right of an attaching creditor to intervene and question judgment has been recognized in other jurisdictions.
O'Keefe vs. Foster,5 Wyo. 343; 40 Pac. 526.
Upon argument the Court permitted the intervenors to
file their petition.
Aside from the main issue, two collateral matters were
also presented:
1. Can an attorney who appeared pro se include attorney's fees in the
judgment although the Complaint does not contain the necessary

DICTA

2.

allegations that the plaintiff paid or obligated himself to pay an
attorney's fees?
Can the Court, notwithstanding the Code provisions and the Rules
of the Supreme Court, waive the five day stay of execution when
the note contains such provision?

Section 425 of the Code provides, inter alia, as follows:
"Execution shall stay until the expiration of said five days, and upon
motion
within said five days the Court shall grant a further stay of execution.
**
*,'

Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, as adopted
July 1, 1929 provides:
"The Trial court shall stay execution until the expiration of five days
from the time of the entry of the judgment * *

*"

This question was not decided by the District Court and indeed raises a very interesting point for discussion.
Prior to the time a hearing was had upon the intervention,
a surety company by a separate action sued the bandits and
attached the same property in order to be reimbursed for
money paid to The Golden Eagle Dry Goods Company, the
insured, for damages caused by these bandits. This raised a
question as to whether a creditor must intervene in the original
attachment case within the thirty days, or can a separate suit
in attachment be started.
One of the bandits was seriously wounded in the gun
battle and was removed to a private hospital. It then became
necessary for the City to place additional policemen at the
hospital, although the bandit, of course, contended that guards
were unnecessary. While guarding the bandit, the policemen
were fed by the hospital, for which the City incurred additional expense. The City filed intervention in the five cases
on the theory that it should be reimbursed for funds expended
in guarding the bandit and feeding the policemen.
Here certainly was a hodge-podge, everybody claiming
the same fund. Finally as a result of many conferences, the
funds were divided proportionately to all the claimants to the
exclusion of the bandits who are now sojourning at Canon
City and it did not become necessary for the trial court to
decide any of the points of law involved. And so "all is well
that ends well."

THE LAW'S DELAY
By Bentley M. McMullin of the Denver Bar
MONG the evils, none would willingly live to bear,
but for the dread of something after death, Hamlet
listed "the law's delay". Delays in justice caused the
barons to wrest from King John at Runnymede the pledge
"To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none will we
delay right or justice". The roots of interminable and endless litigation, exemplified in Bleak House's Jarndyce and
Jarndyce, strangled property rights in this country as well as
in Great Britain, until the pressure of reform brought about
the English Judicature Act of 1873 and the earlier and contemporaneous American codes. Present day conditions in
civil practice show that the courts are again out-distanced by
society's speedy pace and that an accelleration of judicial
civil machinery is again necessary.
That such accelleration can be achieved has been proven
in the once notoriously dilatory criminal field. In recent
years there has been such a continuous wringing of hands at
the alleged eternal procrastination of American criminal justice, and such a hue and cry about the speed and certainty
with which the English courts are said to function, that criminal charges have at length come, in Denver trial courts at
least, to be promptly and speedily disposed of. One or two
months, and sometimes less, is now here regarded as sufficient
time in which to deprive a once free man of liberty and the
pursuit of happiness and even of his right to life itself. With
courts functioning so swiftly when dealing with the most vital
of human rights, it is difficult to see why, in mere matters of
property and commercial transactions, they should still creep
painfully toward an obvious and simple goal. If a court can
hang a man in thirty days, why need it take six months to reduce a simple promissory note to judgment?
That even a common action on a note can be made to
cost the most diligent plaintiff more than six months precious
time and endless hard work is a simple fact, familiar to every
lawyer, "and so is the further circumstance that the time consumed bears no relation whatever to the merits of defense, if
any. In an energetic and vigorous system such delays in civil
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procedure would be unthinkable; the purpose of litigation is
not delay, nor formal perfection, nor genteel horse-play; it is
the achievement of justice. Justice delayed ceases to be such.
Courts must, therefore act promptly, directly, quickly, or they
partially fail.
The effect of such failure is far from theoretical. The
credits tied up in useless litigation are withdrawn from the
resources of the community and their prompt return to the
channels of trade, particularly in a period of credit stringency, is of the utmost importance. The amounts withdrawn
being in the aggregate enormous, and varying directly with
the length of their withdrawal, useless delay must cast a heavy
burden upon commerce. The mere cost of prolonging litigation is itself considerable, and this additional cost must also
be finally passed on to the public. The legal profession likewise bears the burden, for business men, knowing of the delays ahead of them in the courts, use legal proceedings only
as a last and desperate resort when all else has failed, preferring to secure protection through credit associations, insurance, and the employment of lay agencies who thrive more
because of their contrasting promptness than for any other
reason, and who handle a vast amount and variety of legal business. The effect upon the legal profession needs no emphasis,
and shows the necessity, not only to the community, but to the
lawyers who attempt to serve it, of speeding up court proceedings wherever possible without disturbing the substantial
rights of litigants.
It will probably be agreed that the principal causes of
unnecessary delay in ordinary civil procedure are that motions and demurrers neither having nor supposed to have
merit can be and are filed for purely dilatory purposes; that
these motions and demurrers are not promptly disposed of
when filed; that it is possible to compel a plaintiff to go thru
the form of perfecting his pleadings and to prepare for trial
where no defense at all exists; and that continuances are too
frequently granted for wholly insufficient reasons. With these
causes stated, certain definite remedies suggest themselves.
First, the summary disposition of motions. Instead of
noticing, setting and final argument on weekly motion days,
all of which requires from two to three weeks time, motions
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should stand for argument without notice three days after
filing at a daily morning court session, and should then be
summarily heard and determined. They seldom go to the
merits, are nearly always waived by pleading over, and in
exceptional cases, where a real question arises, further time
for briefs and decision can be reserved by the court.
Second, the imposition of costs for frivolous motions and
demurrers. Litigants causing needless delay by dilatory
pleadings would do so less frequently if the penalty were the
payment of double or triple costs, at the time.
Third, the awarding of attorneys fees as costs. One reason for the reputed celerity of English justice lies in the fact
that a successful litigant recovers his attorney's fees. There
are few litigants who wish to purchase delay at its real cost
to their opponent.
Fourth, the entry of summary judgments in commercial
matters upon proof of lack of meritous defense. If at the
time of filing a complaint based on a note, account, or other
commercial transactions, the plaintiff sets forth that the defendant has no real defense and if the defendant fails to show
by counter affidavit that such defense exists, the plaintiff
should not be compelled to get the case at issue, prepare his
proof and await trial; judgment can and should be then entered summarily. This or a similar method is extensively
used, at this date, in Connecticut, Massachusetts and New
York, and can be readily adopted to use elsewhere.
Fifth, continuances should be allowed only upon legal
grounds. Courtesy to counsel in matters of continuances is
misguided; what both parties want and need is a termination
of the litigation.
These simple reforms, requiring but little legislation to
effectuate them, are respectfully submitted as ways of aiding
our courts to achieve their maximum efficiency and usefulness to the community in general and to business in particular.
(')The following table illustrates the time that may be required to prosecute to
judgment an ordinary civil action in the Denver District Court, assuming the plaintiff
to act as promptly as possible and the defendant to exert every possible means of
delaying final judgment. This will serve to illustrate that six months is a conserva-
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tive estimate of the time required. It will probably be agreed that even the ten months
shown here is frequently exceeded, for one cause or another.
Days
1 Complaint filed.
20 Motion for Cost Bond filed.
21 Notice to set Motion for Cost Bond for hearing, served.
22 Motion for Cost Bond set for hearing.
32 Motion for Cost Bond granted; bond filed; time to jlead allowed.
42 Motions to strike, to make more specific, or for Bill of Particulars filed.
43 Notice to set motion to strike, etc., served.
44 Motion to strike, etc., set for hearing.
54 Motion to strike, etc., overruled; time to demur allowed.
64- Demurrer filed.
65 Notice to set demurrer served.
66 Demurrer set for hearing.
76 Demurrer overruled; time to answer allowed.
86 Answer filed.
87 Reply filed.
97 Motion to strike parts of reply filed.
98 Notice to set motion to strike parts of Reply served.
99 Motion to strike parts of reply set for hearing.
109 Motion to strike parts of reply overruled.
119 Notice to set case for trial, jury demanded, served.
154- Case set for trial.
154 Case continued because counsel engaged in another trial.
164 Case continued because of illness of witness.
174 Case continued because of absence of another witness.
204 Case reached for trial.
205 Trial completed.
225 Motion for new trial.
226 Notice to set motion for new trial for hearing served.
227 Motion for new trial set for hearing.
247 Hearing on motion for new trial.
257 Motion for new trial overruled; 30 days stay of execution.
287 Expiration stay of execution.
288 Execution issues.
300 Miscellaneous delays unaccounted for.

The fundamental law of our land is a document that should be studied
not only for its principles but for the great genius that it displayed in encompassing the organic law of a great nation in so small a space and without
waste of words.-John J. Sullivan.

The design and object of the law is to ascertain what is just, honorable
and expedient; and when it is discovered it is proclaimed as a general ordinance equal and impartial to all.-Richard Olney.

The lawyer's great opportunity is to be useful, to teach the principles of
our form of government, to instill respect for law, to show why the law is,
and to spread good citizenship.-John G. Sargent.

THE COLORADO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND WAGE DISPUTES
By Albert J. Gould, Jr., of the Denver Bar
HE jurisdiction of the Colorado Industrial Commission in wage disputes is limited to industries "affected
with a public interest". An article by Thomas Penberthy Fry in the Rocky Mountain Law Review the issue of
June, 1931, states that the jurisdiction of the Commission is
unlimited because of the 1921 statute, and this unqualified
statement is responsible for this article.
The Colorado Industrial Commission does not have
jurisdiction over wage disputes in all industries. Its jurisdiction is limited by the express terms of Chapter 30 of the
1923 Session Laws to industries "affected with a public interest".
The Industrial Commission statute was adopted in 1915
and in Section 30 thereof provided that in industries affected
with a public interest it should be unlawful for an employer
to declare or to cause a lockout or for any employe to go on
a strike prior to an investigation by the Commission. In
1921, Chapter 252 of the Session Laws for that year was enacted which purported to give to the Commission jurisdiction
over wage disputes in all industries. The Governor approved
Chapter 252 of the 1921 Session Laws on April 4, 1921, but
on that same day the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
rendered its decision in the case of People vs. United Mine
Workers, 70 Colorado 269, in which the Supreme Court held
that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission must be
limited to industries "affected with a public interest". This,
in effect, nullified the failure of the Legislature to include
that exception in the 1921 statute but remedied by the 1923
amendment.
The only test, therefore, to be applied in considering an
interested party's obligation to comply with notices received
from the Industrial Commission requiring a hearing before
a reduction in wages or a lockout or strike is to become effective is whether the industry in question is one "affected with
a public interest". If not, the notices may be disregarded and
the desired action taken without fear of prosecution.
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The Commission, in its endeavor to be of service to the
public generally will attempt to assume jurisdiction over such
disputes in any industry.
If the industry relates to "heat, food or shelter" (People
v. United Mine Workers, id.), it generally is held to be affected with a public interest, but whether an industry is
"affected with a public interest" may be determined without
much difficulty because the books are full of cases upon this
subject.
In the case of In Re Morgan 26 Colo. 415, in which it
was held that the business of smelting metalliferous ores was
not affected with a public interest, the Court quoted, with
approval, the following:
" 'The object of government is to impose that degree of restraint upon
human actions, which is necessary to the uniform and reasonable conservation
and enjoyment of private rights. * * * The conservation of private rights is
attained by the imposition of a wholesome restraint upon their exercise, such
a restraint as will prevent the infliction of injury upon others in the enjoyment of them.'
'This police power of the state extends to the protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state.'
"'Any law which goes beyond that principle which undertakes to abolish rights, the exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the rights
of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is necessary to provide
for the public welfare and the general security, cannot be included in the
police power of the government.'
"'It may be restrained only in so far as it is necessary for the common
welfare and the equal protection and benefit of the pepole. That such restraint of the right and liberty of contract is for the common public welfare
and equal protection and benefit of the people, must appear, not only to the
general assembly, by force of popular clamor, or the pressure of the lobby, but
also to the courts; and it must be so clear that a court of justice, in the calm
deliberation of its judgment, may be able to see that such restraint is for the
common welfare and equal protection and benefit of the people.' "

The Court in deciding this case also said:
"In selecting a subject for the exercise of the police power the legislature must keep within its true scope. The reason for the existence of the

power rests upon the theory that one must so use his own as not to injure
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others, and so as not to interfere with, or injure, the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare."

In the above case of People vs. United Mine Workers,
70 Colo. 269, it was decided that the Colorado coal mine industry was affected with a public interest, and in discussing
the question the Court said:
"Unless coal mining may be said to be affected with a public interest its
regulation by statute to the extent attempted by said chapter is unconstitutional,

see the cases cited below. The words 'affected with a public interest' were
no doubt used by the General Assembly to keep the statute within constitutional limits. It becomes necessary, then, not only in order to construe the
statute, but to decide whether it is constitutional, to determine whether coal
mining is so affected, and it seems self-evident that it is. * * * Food, shelter
and heat, before all others, are the great necessities of life and, in modern life,
heat means coal."

In a note commencing on page 834 of 6 L. R. A. (New
Series), we find cases referred to which have held that the
following are affected with a public interest:
"Railroads, street railways, ferries, toll bridges, turnpike roads, telegraph companies, telephone companies, the business of supplying natural and
artificial gas, the business of supplying water for domestic and irrigating purposes, the business of wharfing, milling, storing grain, operating grain elevators
and operating stock yards."

The most recent case upon this subject is Williams vs.
Standard Oil Company, decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States on January 2, 1929, and reported in 49 U. S.
Supreme Court Reporter 115. In this case, the Legislature
of Tennessee had attempted to fix the price at which gasoline
might be sold in the said State. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the Legislature did not have such
power because the business of selling gasoline was not affected
with a public interest. In part the Court said:
"It is settled by recent decisions of this Court that a state legislature is
without constitutional power to fix prices at which commodities may be sold,
services rendered, or property used, unless the business or property involved
is 'affected with a public interest'. Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court,
262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct., 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103, 27 A. L. R 1280; Tyson &
Brothers v. Banton. Nothing is gained by reiterating the statement that the
phrase is indefinite. By repeated decisions of this court, beginning with Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77, that phrase, however it may be characterized, has become the established test by which the legislative power to fix
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prices of commodities, use of property, or services, must be measured. As applied in particular instances, its meaning may be considered both from an
affirmative and a negative point of view. Affirmatively, it means that a business or property, in order to be affected with a public interest, must be such or
be so employed as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a public
use and its use thereby in effect granted to the public. Tyson & Brother v.
Banton, supra, 273 U. S. 434. Negatively, it does not mean that a business
is affected with a public interest merely because it is large or because the public
are warranted in having a feeling of concern in respect of its maintenance.
Id., 273 U. S. 430. The meaning and application of the phrase are examined
at length in the Tyson case, and we see no reason for restating what is there
said.
"In support of the act under review it is urged that gasoline is of widespread use; that enormous quantities of it are sold in the State of Tennessee;
and that it has become necessary and indispensable in carrying on commercial
and other activities within the state. But we are here concerned with the
character of the business, not with its size or the extent to which the commodity is used. Gasoline is one of the ordinary commodities of trade, differing, so far as the question here is affected, in no essential respect from a great
variety of other articles commonly bought and sold by merchants and private
dealers in the country. The decisions referred to above make it perfectly clear
that the business of dealing in such articles, irrespective of its extent, does not
come within the phrase 'affected with a public interest'. Those decisions control the present case."

The case of Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, referred to
in the above opinion, contains a most complete discussion of
the meaning of the words "affected with a public interest".
In that case the legislature of the State of New York passed
a law limiting the prices at which theater tickets might be
re-sold. The Supreme Court of the United States held that
such statute was unconstitutional because the business involved
(the theater business) was not affected with a public interest.
The United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit
recently held that the business of milling flour is not affected
with a public interest.
The foregoing citations illustrate to some extent the types
of business which have been held not to be affected with a
public interest, and, in view of the fundamental law and the
terms of our statute, indicate the limitations of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado
as to wage disputes, lockouts and strikes.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN HALL, FIRST
CHIEF JUSTICE, TERRITORY
OF COLORADO
By Fred Y. Holland of the Denver Bar
ENJAMIN FRANKLIN HALL, the first Chief Jusof the Supreme Court of the Territory of Colorado, was born at Whitehall, N. Y., on July 23, 1814.
He was appointed Chief Justice of the new Territorial government by President Lincoln, who thereby testified to the
highest regard for his character and ability. Judge Hall received his commission in March, 1861, and shortly thereafter
began the long and perilous journey to the West, arriving in
Denver three weeks later.
As chief judicial officer, the first and most important duty
with which he was confronted after his arrival at the capitol
was the organization of the Judiciary of the Territory. The
Legislature which convened in Denver on September 9, 1861,
solicited and received his advice and recommendations on all
Legislation pertaining to the subject. In addition to the manifold duties incident to the organization of the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Hall found time to participate actively in the
affairs of the Episcopal church, of which he was a distinguished member. It is a surprising fact, however, that the
local histories of Colorado and of Denver contain very little
information concerning the life of this appointee and friend
of President Lincoln. Aside from the official records on file
in the Supreme Court Library, I found certain statistical records of the life of Judge Hall and his ancestors in a "History
of Cayuga County, N. Y.", where he spent the greater part
of his life; in a brief biography in the "National Cyclopedia
of American Biography", volume 13, and in the unpublished
reminiscences of Judge Hall with reference to his connection
with the early Episcopal church in Denver.
Judge Hall was a direct descendant of Francis Hall, one
of the English founders of the Colony of New Haven. His
American ancestors were all Connecticut people, with Connecticut residences, traditions, principles, habits and manners. They were enterprising, intrepid, and well-to-do in the
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communities where they resided. Judge Hall was born and
reared on his father's farm in Washington County, New York.
He was privileged to attend school only when his duties on
the farm permitted, and at such times he alternated between
attending and teaching school. At the age of twenty he began
the study of law in the law office of Surrogate Judge John
H. Parker, at Auburn, the county-seat of Cayuga County,
New York, in 1839, and on completion thereof began the
practice of law at Auburn.
Early in life Judge Hall evinced a profound interest in
the history of the scriptures, and wrote several articles on the
subject which were published in the New York newspapers.
Encouraged by learned men of his acquaintance, one of whom
was the distinguished Bishop De Lancey, he made extensive
researches and wrote a scholarly treatise upon the "Judicial
and Political Economy of the Hebrew Commonwealth",
which was published and sold by Doubleday and Ivison, of
Auburn, New York. This was the first of several books of
which he was the author, the others being entitled: "The
Trial of Freemen", "Our Commercial Relations with the rest
of Mankind", "The Republican Party", "The Landowner's
Manual", and a "Brief and Concise History of the Canadas"
in two volumes.
Judge Hall took an active part in the affairs of the Community and State in which he resided. He was a member of
the State Legislature of New York in 184-4, and was elected
Mayor of Auburn in 1854. In 1850 he was appointed by
President Fillmore to compile and index the Decisions of the
Attorneys General of the U. S., and the result was published
in six volumes, "remarkable for their thoroughness, accuracy
and excellence".
Except for the periods of time which he spent in public
offices Judge Hall continued the practice of his profession
until his appointment as Chief Justice of Colorado Territory
in 1861. An interesting account of his first official activities
as Chief Justice is given in Wharton's History of Denver,
published in 1866, as follows: "Pursuant to proclamation on
March 10th by the Governor of the Territory, the Supreme
Court was organized at 10 o'clock A. M. in the building next
the Herald office. Chief Justice Hall addressed those present
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at length, in a very fine speech, closing with remarks on the
qualifications of members of the legal profession, and recommending that a committee be appointed to examine those desiring admission to practice as attorneys. Wm.R. Likin, I.
N. Bassett, J. T. Coleman and J. Bright Smith, were appointed such committee. On the day following the rules of
the Supreme Court were adopted for observance, and about
thirty attorneys were admitted to practice, among whom might
be mentioned the names of Moses Hallett, H. M. Teller, J.
Bright Smith, Governor Gilpin, Amos Steck, and others."
The Supreme Court consisted of three Judges, appointed
by the President for a term of four years, at a salary of
$1800.00 annually. The two associate members were Stephen
S. Harding and Allan A. Bradford. The Legislature at its
first session divided the Territory into three Judicial Districts,
and assigned one Supreme Court Judge to each district. The
Judges therefore tried cases in the first instance in their respective districts, and then met as a Supreme Court to decide
the cases brought up to them on appeal from their nisi prius
judgments.
I can find no record of any opinion having been written
by Chief Justice Hall while sitting as a member of the Supreme Court. One of the first nisi prius decisions which he
rendered, and which evidently was never appealed, was "the
case of Joel McKee, a Texan who came to Denver with a
commission from the rebel General Sibley and commenced
the business of recruiting for the rebel service. McKee was
arrested and his attorneys applied to Judge Hall for a writ
of habeas corpus. (Nothing had been done at Washington
to suspend the operation of the writ of habeas corpus as a
war measure in the new Territory.) The Judge surprised
them with a prompt and well considered decision, based upon
the meaning imputed to that clause of the constitution by
those who framed it, that being in rebellion against the Government, they had forfeited the privilege of having it granted
to them".
Chief Justice Hall resigned his commission in 1863, on
account of the inadequate salary, and resumed the practice of
law in Auburn, N. Y. On the date of his departure an editorial appeared in the Daily Denver Commonwealth, from
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which I quote: "Chief Justice Hall carries with him the
best wishes of the best portion of this community to his new
field of labor. A few of the lawyers and spectators complained of some of his early decisions before they understood
his judicial policy. But ever since they comprehended his
ideas in respect to our lands they have approved it. We think
we are warranted in stating that at no period of his administration here has there been a single voice lifted against his
legal ability, patience, patriotism -and purity. He has been
an industrious, patient, politic, able and upright Judge. By
those whose ante-territorial ranch and mining titles have been
upheld and confirmed by his decisions as against the rapacity
of jumpers and speculators he will long be regarded as a public benefactor."
As a pioneer of the Episcopal Church, in Denver, Judge
Hall, with the assistance of a few others, fitted up a large
brick building on the public land in Denver for a church
edifice, and had it consecrated by Bishop Talbot. He served
as a senior warden as long as he remained here. Shortly after
he resigned and had left Denver, the Rector and vestrymen
met, passed the following resolution and had the same published in the Denver papers and church journals, elsewhere:
"Resolved, That as it was through the untiring exertions
of Senior Warden Hall that we came possessed of this edifice
in which our praise and prayers are offered to Almighty God,
it is with profound regret that we feel obliged to accept his
resignation.
"Resolved, that we bear willing and grateful testimony
to the salutary influence during his residence, here, of his
consistent walk and conversation as a private Christian man,
of his integrity and incorruptibility as a Judge, and to the
inestimable worth of his exertions to establish and maintain
in this Territory, the Apostolic Church of Christ."
After retiring from the Supreme Court Bench of Colorado Territory, he was appointed to the office of Consul General of Valparaiso. But for reasons mostly of a domestic
character he declined to accept it. He was then offered and
accepted the position of Superintendent of Commercial Statistics in the State Department under Secretary Seward.
While holding that position he compiled from documents in
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the State Department the work, above referred to, entitled,
"Our Commercial Relations with the rest of Mankind."
On the expiration of his service in the State Department
at Washington he resumed the practice of law in Auburn,
where he died September 6, 1891.
Judge Hall remained in Colorado Territory for a period
of less than three years, but the patriotic motives which impelled him to accept the appointment of Chief Justice of the
newly created Territory, at that crucial time in the Country's
history; the untiring efforts which he gave to the office, his
devotion and assistance to his church, and his accomplishments in the formation of the commonwealth all combine to
make his contribution of the highest magnitude.
A new method of attempting to enforce collection of debts has been referred to the Denver Bar committee on "Illegal Practices". The form properly filled in is sent the debtor by mail. As a matter of general interest the
same is reprinted below:

DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY
JOHN DOE, Creditor
vs.
RICHARD ROE, Debtor

Secondary service
to recover debt of
$ xxx

We, the undersigned, do hereby state that; although good and sufficient
notice has been tendered to the above named debtor of his, her or their unpaid
account, to date there is now justly due and owing to the above named creditor the sum above named; that no part of the same has been paid; that to
protect the above named creditor from loss it becomes necessary to resort to
SECONDARY SERVICE, and that after one week from date we DISCLAIM ALL LIABILITY for any loss of position; injury to prestige, credit
standing, reputation or influence, or for any other serious losses or damages
caused by its use, or to become liable for any suit or action instituted for such
losses, injuries or damages incurred by the debtor
as a result of SECONDARY SERVICE.
Dated, and seal attached hereto this 19th day of
October, 193 1.

THE X & Y STORES
Legal Division

DENVER, COLORADO
"Remember a patch on your coat and money in your pocket is better and more
creditable than a writ on your back and no money to take it off."-Benjamin Franklin.

+++ Dictaphun ++
A GEORGETOWN WORTHY*
The conductor (laughter) of this column (renewed laughter) has found
it is much easier to use some one else's stuff than to compose the same. (Applause.) The present writer holds no brief for his predecessor-or for any
one else. (Applause on the Democratic side.) Nevertheless the predecessor
aforesaid was always eloquent when not original and we will be the same.
E. g.: In the collection he has made of books, papers and writings concerning early Colorado Fred Y. Holland, Esq., Librarian of the Supreme
Court, possesses a number of copies of The Centennial, published at Georgetown in-believe it or not-1876. No. 1, Volume 1, asserts: "Our readers
and patrons must not conclude, because we have called our sheet THE CENTENNIAL, that it is only to be published once every hundred years, for we
assure them, before half that time expires, they may safely calculate on seeing
No. 2 of this Vol." And they did, because it is in No. 2 thereof that we find
the language which is going to fill up this space for this month-and now we
won't have to work again until the Editor-in-Chief tells us two or three times
that Messieurs Kistler are holding the presses. That is to say:
A SKETCH
In the earlier days of Georgetown, A
T-was one of its best and
ablest lawyers. Besides being a clever, companionable fellow, he was a fine
speaker, leading off without preparation in a bold, dashing, impromptu style,
always supported by a native impudence which was never known to be abashed
in any presence, nor on any occasion. He was considerably below the average
height of men, with a large head and high forehead, and his keen eyes had in
them an expression of impatient desire, such as becomes chronic in an old toper,
without money, who is constantly speculating on his chances for the next glass
of whiskey, of which he was a prodigious consumer. He drank early in the
morning and drank often; he drank after breakfast, and drank frequently;
he drank before dinner, and drank untiringly; he drank after dinner, and
drank persistently; he drank before tea, and drank inveterately; he drank
after tea, and drank tremendously; continuing to drink on in that way when
in congenial company, until every other man was under the table.
A sense of personal obligation never startled his conscience, of which we
will give one memorable instance:
PM
, of Central City, sent him accounts and notes for
collection, including one of $8 against T. himself. These he promptly collebted and remitted to M., deducting the amount of his fees for collecting,
with the exception of the note against himself, which he said he could not
01876 expression, meaning wot-a-man.

54

DICTA

collect, and accordingly, as attorney for M., sued himself before a justice of
the peace, got a judgment and execution, which was returned, with "no property found".
He immediately sent the following bill to M.:
"Services rendered, case of M. vs. T., $25.00", and drew on him for the
amount, which was promptly remitted.

THIS GOES FOR DICTA TOO
At the mast head of No. 1, Vol. 1, of The Centennial", is this language:
"Circulation-il,000 copies occasionally." In No. 2 this is omitted.
On the last page of No. 2 is an advertisement whose chaste simplicity
commends itself to the weary victims of the keep-your-Adam's-apple-kissablebecause-its-got-to-be-good school of copy writers. Said advertisement reads:
YATES HOUSE SALOON
D. S. Dickey, Prop.
The Bar is furnished with the best
LIQUORS
To be found in Georgetown.
'The Centennial was published by James S. Randall, who still resides in Georgetown.

Laws were devised for the safety of citizens and the preservation of
states.-Cicero.
A precedent embalms a principle-Benjamin Disraeli.
Men would be great criminals did they need as many laws as they make.
-- Sir Charles John Darling

BOOKS RECEIVED AT THE
SUPREME COURT LIBRARY
Shoemaker on Trademarks, 1931, 2 vols.
Anderson, Limitations on Corporate Entity, 1931, 1 vol.
Bowers, The Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts, 1931, 1 vol.
Bates' Pleading, Practice, Parties and Forms, 1931, 1 vol.
Griffin and Curtis, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales Under the
Uniform Sales Act, 1931, 5th Ed., 1 vol.
Abbott's Trial Evidence, 1931, 4th Ed., 3 vols.
All the latest Session Laws and Statutes of all the States.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDrrOa's NoT.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-INSTRUCTIONS--PERSONAL

INJURIES-Fox Colorado

Theatre Company vs. Zipprodt-No. 12909-Decided September 28, 1931.
-Mr. Justice Alter delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. In personal injury case it is error to instruct a jury that it was
incumbent upon the defendant to use reasonable care in providing a place
whereat and whereon the plaintiff had been invited to dance or give a public
exhibition, and if defendant failed to use reasonable care in providing such a
place, that the jury should find for the plaintiff.
2. This instruction was faulty in that it directed the jury to find the
issues for the plaintiff upon failure of the defendant to use reasonable care
irrespective of the question as to whether the negligence of the defendant was
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, or whether or not the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence.
3. Such instruction should have included a statement that such negligence must be a proximate cause of the injury and there must be absence of
contributory negligence in order that the issues be found for the plaintiff.
4. The instructions given by the Court contained no instruction that no
one of them contains all of the law applicable to the case, but that they must
be taken, read and considered together because they are related and connected
to each other as a whole.

5.

Query:

Had such latter instruction been given, would the case have

been reversed ?-Judgment reversed.

CRIMINAL LAw-RAPE-MISCONDUCT OF TRIAL JUDGE-MISCONDUCT OF
DISTRICT ATTORNEY-REFUSAL TO GIVE TENDERED INSTRUCTIONSSTRIKING OF SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL-Milow v. The

People-No. 12797-Decided October 5, 1931-Mr. Justice Alter delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. Where, in a rape case, the trial judge, in ordering all persons under
eighteen years of age, except witnesses, excluded, remarked that the testimony
to be introduced would be disagreeable and that in this class of cases the testimony was repulsive, and no objections were made to that part of the order
excluding children, and the testimony later showed that while the remarks
were prophetic, they were nevertheless true, no error was committed.

2. Where the trial court ordered the mother of the defendant to leave
the court room for coaching the defendant by shaking her head when he was
testifying, such order was not error.
3. Where district attorney in argument commented upon fact that defendant's child was born within four months after his marriage and that

DICTA
defendant's mother had been excluded from the court room on account of
coaching defendant, and no objection was made at the time, nor was court
requested to instruct jury to disregard it, such error will not be considered.
4. Where the record showed that defendant made no objection to instructions given by court and tendered none, and thereafter just as court was
about to read instructions to jury, defendant stated he would like to tender
instructions which was refused by court, but such instructions were neither
filed or tendered in compliance with rule 7, and the record does not disclose
the trial court's refusal to give them, and they are not in the record except as
attached to motion for new trial, they will not be considered by this court.
5. Supplemental motion for a new trial must be filed at the same term.
6. Action of attorney for the People, in attaching counter-affidavits to
its brief to counteract affidavits filed in trial court, where such counteraffidavits are first filed in this court, is highly improper and this court on its
own motion strikes them from record.-Judgment affirmed.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-LANDLORD

WAIVING CONDITION AGAINST As-

SIGNMENT BY CONDUCT-PLEADING--REs ADJUDICATA-STARE DECISiS
-EFFECT OF FORMER DECISION-Hughes v. Jones-No. 12472-Decided

October 5, 1931-Mr. Justice Campbell delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. The Court will take judicial notice of its own records, and if not res
adjudicata, the Court may, on the principle of stare decisis, rightfully examine
and consider the decision in a former case as affecting consideration of the
case at bar.
2. Where, in a former case, between the same parties, it was decided
that a lessor had waived his right to declare a forfeiture of a lease by accepting
rentals regularly from an assignee of lessee without objection, after the lease
had been assigned in violation of a clause prohibiting such transfer without
the written consent of lessor, and assignee had expended a large amount in
improvements to the leasehold, such decision is at least stare decisis if not res
adjudicata.
3. In a subsequent case, it was proper for the trial court to strike from
the pleadings, the defense that the lessor had not consented in writing to the
assignment of the lease.
4. Judgment thereafter in favor of assignee of lessee in a suit by sole
heir of lessor for possession and damages, was proper.
5. Sole heir of an ancestor lessor is bound by acts of deceased lessor in
waiving terms of written lease against assignment without consent in writing
of lessor.-Judgment affirmed.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-The Continental Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Cochran-No. 12513-Decided October 5, 1931-Mr. Justice Moore delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. In an action brought by an insurance company against the insurance
commissioner to obtain a declaratory judgment determining a controversy between it and the commissioner as to the legal construction of certain pro-
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visions of its charter, wherein the company contended that under such provisions, it could, out of moneys paid in by charter members pay commissions
for writing the business, and the commissioner contended that it could not
pay out for commissions or any other purpose any part of the moneys so received, but that the same must be held in trust for the charter members, the
charter members are necessary parties to such action.
2. In the absence of such parties, a declaratory judgment would not
terminate the uncertainty of controversy.
3. Under such circumstances the district court was not authorized to
enter a declaratory judgment.-Judgment reversed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CONSTRUCTION

OF SEC.

57

AND SEC.

73 oF

COMPENSATION AcT-MEANING OF "ACCRUED"-The Employers Mutual

Insurance Company v. The Industrial Commission-No. 12837-Decided
October 5, 1931-Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. Where an injured employe was awarded compensation based upon
temporary disability, thereafter died from illness and not from injury, and
subsequent to his death the commission made an award based upon permanent
partial disability, that Mrs. Wilkerson, to whom he was indebted for board
and lodging, be paid $300.00 for such board and lodging and necessary care,
the district court erred in sustaining such award.
2. Sec. 57 provides that where injured employe leaves no dependents,
the commission may order the application of any accrued and unpaid benefits
up to the time of his death, paid upon the expenses of the last sickness or
funeral, does not authorize the commission to make the payments except out of
accrued and unpaid benefits existing at the time of death.
3. Sec. 73 simply provides that injured employe shall in addition to
compensation to be paid for temporary disability, be paid for 139 weeks under
conditions therein specified.
4. The Workmen's Compensation Act is intended to compensate an
employe for injuries received while performing duties arising out of and in
the course-,of their employment. It is not intended as a death benefit act or
to pay for modical, hospital, funeral, or other expenses incurred by reason of
such injuries, illness, or death.
5. However it is not unreasonable to pay dependents or where there are
none, to pay on account of such expenses, any unpaid installments of compensation that may have become due and payable during lifetime of employe.
6. The word "accrued"
-Judgment reversed.

as used in the act means due and payable.

CRIMINAL LAW-VIOLATION OF CITY ORDINANCE AGAINST DISPLAYING
GOODS OR WARES ON STREET-FAILURE TO CHARGE OFFENSE-Cor-

nelius v. The People-No. 12470--Decided October 5, 1931-Mr. Justice

Moore delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. Cornelius was charged with violation of city ordinance prohibiting
display of goods on sale on street. The ordinance in question prohibited such
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display, but provided no penalty for such display and only provided penalty

for selling or offering to sell.

He sold no goods nor offered any for sale.

The court below directed a verdict of guilty.

2. Where a specific violation of an ordinance is charged, it must be
proven.

3. Assuming that displaying goods for sale on the street constitutes an
offer for sale inhibited by the ordinance, defendant could not be found guilty
of the offense, because he was not charged therewith.-Judgment reversed.
ATTORNEYS AT LAw-DISBARMENT-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSEss-AccoMPLICEs-People v. Boutcher-No. 12547

-Decided October 5, 1931-Mr. Justice Adams delivered the opinion of
the Court.
1. Boutcher, an attorney at law, was found guilty of gross professional
misconduct by referee in aiding and abetting and procuring three witnesses to
subscribe their names to a will, not in the presence of the testator, and certifying that it was signed in their presence by the testator, and that they, at testator's request and in his presence, and in the presence of each other signed as
subscribing witnesses. The attorney denied any knowledge of the perjury
and denied aiding, assisting, or abetting or procuring it. The referee found
him guilty on the testimony of two of the accomplices.
2. One may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.
3. The testimpny of one accomplice may corroborate that of another,
and when corroboration is required, this is sufficient.
4. Where the credibility of witnesses is attacked, the nature of the case
must be considered. Where the witnesses testify as accomplices and admit
their connection with perjured documents and perjured testimony, it must
be remembered that just such kind of witnesses would naturally be sought to
accomplish such a purpose.
5. The effect would be disastrous to depart from the rule announced in
paragraph 3 hereof.-Respondent disbarred.
Justices Hilliard and Butler dissent.
DIVORCE-APPLICATION TO MODIFY JUDGMENT FOR PERMANENT ALIMONY

-CHANGE
IN FINANCIAL STATus-Canary v. Canary-No. 12894Decided October 5, 1931-Mr. Justice Burke delivered the opinion of the
Court.
1. In an action by husband to modify a judgment for permanent alimony, solely on ground of change in financial status and his inability to make
the payments by reason thereof, the lower court erred in sustaining an objection and dismissing application on ground that such a reason was insufficient.
2. In such an application for modification, it is not necessary to allege
fraud, mistake, overreaching, unfairness or inequity.
3. Financial reverses of former husband is just as good a ground for
modification as those set forth in paragraph 2 hereof.-Judgment reversed
with directions.
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CONTEMPT-JURISDICTION OF COURT-ExEMPTION FROM PROCEss-EXTRA-

DITION-WAIVER-Norquist

v. Norquist-No. 12902-Decided October

5, 1931-Mr. Justice Adams delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. Where a defendant in a divorce action fails to comply with order of
Court for payment of support money for minor children, leaves jurisdiction
and is extradited from sister state to answer criminal charge of non-support
in Colorado Court, and while in Colorado, by virtue of extradition proceedings, is charged with and found guilty of contempt of civil court for such
failure, the civil court has jurisdiction.
2. Quaere? Was the defendant exempt from civil process while in
Colorado on extradition from a sister state on a criminal charge?
3. Even if it were conceded that he was exempt, such exemption was
waived by defendant not objecting to a number of orders made by trial court
in divorce action after he was extradited, and first raising the question of
immunity some five months after extradition.-Judgment a/firmed.

WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION-NON-RESIDENT-EMPLOYE
INJURED
IN
SISTER STATE-Tripp v. The Industrial Commission, et al.-No. 12867-

Decided October 13, 1931-Mr. Justice Burke delivered the opinion of
the Court.
1. Where a Nevada Corporation maintains a general sales office in
Colorado and employs a salesman, who performs his duties for the Company
in Kansas, and while working in Kansas moves his family to Kansas and is
injured in Kansas, The Industrial Commission of Colorado is without jurisdiction to award compensation.
2. The purpose of The Industrial Compensation Act is to regulate the
relation of employer and employe in the State of Colorado; therefore to
constitute a person an employe under the provisions of the Act, such person
must render service for another in the State of Colorado.-Judgmenta/firmed.

APPEAL AND ERROR-MOOT CASE-MUNICIPAL
OF VILLAGE TRUSTEE-Goerke v. The Board

CORPORATIONS--REMOVAL

of Trustees of the Town of
Manitou, et al.-No. 12473-Decided October 13, 1931-Mr. Justice
Campbell delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. Where a village trustee was ousted by the village board of trustees,
and thereafter obtained a writ of certiorari from the District Court, and was
unsuccessful in the District Court, and sued out a writ of error, and while the
case is pending in the Supreme Court, the term of office for which he was
elected has expired, the case becomes moot.
2. Where one's right to hold an elective office is in controversy before
the Court and before a decision thereon, his term of office has expired, the
Court will not examine into his right to the office, and the writ of error will
be dismissed.-Writ of error dismissed.
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RIGHTS-PRIORITIES-OWNERSHIP

IN

DITCHES--

RIGHT TO USE WATER-Robinson, et al v. The Alfalfa Ditch Co., et al.-

No. 12396-Decided October 26, 1931-Mr. Justice Butler delivered the
opinion of the Court.
1. Decrees under the Water Adjudication Statute determine only the
priorities of the several ditches and the amount of water awarded thereto.
2. In such proceedings, the Court has no jurisdiction to determine
ownership or property rights in the ditches, or to determine who has the right
to use the water awarded to the various ditches.
3. Where an irrigation ditch is enlarged, sworn statement must be
recorded within ninety days after the commencement of construction or enlargement of the ditch, and no priority of right for any purpose shall attach
to any such enlargement until such record is made, which provisions above
were contained in the Session Laws of 1881, are void, being in conflict with
Section 21 Article 5 of the Constitution.
4. The defendants, basng their claim on a right to convey water through
the ditch by virtue of an enlargement, and the evidence showing that their
predecessors conveyed water through the ditch from another source other than
that source of the plaintiffs' water supply, the defendants are not entitled to
any part of the water decreed to the Alfalfa Ditch.-Judgment affirmed.

WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS-NUISANCE-MAINTENANCE

-The

OF HEADGATE

Seven Lakes Water Users Association v. The Fort Lyon Canal

Company-No. 12783-Decided October 26, 1931-Mr. Justice Campbell delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. Where defendant maintains an intake ditch and dam without proper
control devices, such acts are nuisances.
2. Such acts are both public and private nuisances.
3. Where the failure of the defendant to maintain a headgate at or
near its own original site, contributed, with natural causes such as a flood
that destroyed the original headgate, this does not operate to relieve the defendant of its statutory duty to maintain a headgate or some device equivalent
thereto in its ditch.

4. Where the lower court ordered the defendant to erect and maintain
in good repair suitable and proper headgates and construct a proper dam
across the intake of the defendant's ditch sufficient to control and divert the
waters of the river, and the option is given to the defendant to have therein
a proper headgate and control device, the mere fact that the cost thereof
would be great is not sufficient reason for not complying with such order.Judgment affirmed.
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Automatic Gas Heat
has made old-time basement drudgery a thing of
the past. Now the head
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an extra half hour on
zero winter morningswith never a thought of
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